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NOTES AND COMMENT
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF CONTRACTORS' SURETY BONDS
INVOLVING STATE INTEREST
The modern trend towards shifting business risks over upon
the compensated surety brings sharply into focus the third party
beneficiary doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox,' as it relates to the right of
laborers or materialmen to recover directly from a surety by way of
suit on a bond secured by the contractor as part of an original con-
struction agreement.
Such a bond is the indicia of the security promise of the surety
bought by the contractor and running directly to the person intended
to be benefited, who is generally, though not necessarily, the owner
of the property and often the only one intended to be benefited at
the time the agreement was made. In New York, the beneficiary
must be a direct beneficiary 2 who is identified as the one intended
to be directly benefited according to the objective intent extracted
from the words of the instrument.3 Yet, direct beneficiaries need not
be known at the time the contract is made. All that is required is
that they be ascertainable at the time of the performance.4 Where
statutes direct the securing of such a bond, some courts hold that for
the purpose of ascertaining intent, it is as though the statute itself
were read into and made a part of the instrument.5
Statutes have been adopted by Congress and by a number of the
states, making it the duty of public officers in certain cases to require
of contractors for public work bonds conditioned for the payment of
the claims of laborers and materialmen. Most of such statutes require-
this provision in addition to the condition for the faithful performance
of the contract, and contemplate a single bond protecting both the
public body and the laborers and materialmen. Some of these stat-
utes merely require bonds for the payment of laborers and material-
men without defining the rights of such persons with respect to the
bonds and without expressly authorizing such persons to sue on the
bond. Other states not only require bonds conditioned for the benefit
of laborers and materialmen, but expressly provide that such bonds
shall inure to their use and benefit or that they may sue thereon.
120 N. Y. 268 (1859).
2 A direct beneficiary is one to be benefited directly by the performance
of the contract and not from its breach. A beneficiary failing to meet this
requirement is an incidental beneficiary having no greater standing than a per-
son interested in the transaction from idle curiosity. WHITNEY, CONTRACTS
§ 76 (4th ed. 1946).
3 Simson v. Brown, 68 N. Y. 355 (1877); Garsney v. Rogers, 47 N. Y.
233 (1872) ; see Note, 77 A. L. R. 28, 29 (1932). The intentions of the parties
control in the creation of a right under the bond; but once the right is created,
the law furnishes the remedy irrespective of the intention of the parties.
4 Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors' Surety Bonds,
38 YALE L. J. 2 (1928).
5 See Note, 77 A. L. R. 152, 163 (1932).
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Many states, including New York, provide a remedy of recovery,
by way of the lien statute, for the individual who has benefited the
real property directly by his labor or materials; but since the lien is
limited to an in rem remedy against the private property benefited
or -the public funds provided, it becomes more advantageous to be
able to proceed directly against the surety where the indebtedness
exceeds the value of* the property or public funds.6
This note is concerned with the right of the third party to seek
his remedy directly from the surety by an action on the bond. The
scope of inquiry involves not merely a determination whether the
-claim was intended to be within the coverage of the bond, but whether
other interests, such as the interest of the state, will preclude recovery
from the surety by way of an action on the bond. Also, a party
claimant may be within the coverage of the bond and yet the claim
may not. For example, the nature of the labor or materials supplied
may be determinative of whether the party comes within the cover-
age of the lien statute or the bond, as for instance where they go
directly into the performance of the principal contract.7
The difficulty of ascertaining the exact limits of the class of per-
sons entitled to recover on such bond arises not so much from a com-
plicated problem of law as it does from the multiplicity of parties in-
volved and the constructions of the bond instruments, which have
varied so widely in their terms that many decisions are so far re-
garded rather as aids to reasoning than as precedents. The question
usually presented is, whether, from the terms of the particular in-
strument, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, an
intent to confer upon the third party a right to proceed directly against
the surety can be discerned. In the absence of such a right, the action
is limited to one against the owner who can then turn to the surety
for his remedy.8
6 New York has provided the laborer or materialman with a lien remedy
against private realty improved by them. N. Y. LIEN LAW § 3. However,
no such lien attaches to public property itself. Instead, a lien is provided at-
taching to the public funds. N. Y. LIEN LAW § 5. So that, even where a
state has enacted a lien statute, the lien remedy is less attractive where the
public is the obligee.
7 But this will not be true if the claim is too remote. Royal Indemnity
Co. v. Day and Maddock Co., 114 Ohio St. 58, 150 N. E. 426 (1926) (dis-
allowing claim for rental of a concrete mixer used by the contractor) ; Beals
v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 76 App. Div. 526, 78 N. Y. Supp. 584 (4th Dep't
1902) (disallowing claim for cost of tools and implements used in performance
of a contract for the construction of a retaining wall, where the tools and im-
plements survived the performance). But cf. Title Guaranty Co. v. Crane,
219 U. S. 24, 55 L. ed. 73 (1910); National Surety Co. v. United States, 228
Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 6th 1916) (where the federal statute, on the other hand,
has been construed to include some of the very items disallowed elsewhere).
"See Byram Lumber and Supply Co. v. Page, 109 Conn. 256, 258, 146
Ati. 293, 295 (1929).
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Less difficulty has been encountered where the language of the
bond expresses an intention to primarily benefit a third party; 9 or
where the bond is given in obedience to a statute directing that the
bond provide a cause of action for third parties; 10 or where there
is a specific recital that the third party may enforce an action on the
bond; 11 or where there is no express reference to third parties. 12
Where the intent is clearly to indemnify a specific person (such
as the owner of the property) against all claims of the materialmen
and laborers, the latter are not direct beneficiaries and can not act on
the bond.' 3  Such an intent is usually evidenced by direct expressions
in the bond or deduced from language indicating a purpose to hold
the owner harmless in relation to any money that might be due the
materialmen from the contractor.' 4
It is the middle-ground, between bond agreements indicating an
intent to indemnify and those indicating an express intent to permit
a third party to enforce an action directly against the surety on the
bond, which is examined here.
The controversial problem arises in the narrow but not uncom-
mon situation where a state or municipality requires that a bond be
furnished, in obedience to a statute, conditioned upon faithful per-
formance of the building contract. This, in and of itself, would pose
no problem were it not for the custom that arose whereby agencies
of the state or municipality requested the inclusion among the terms
of the bond of a clause guaranteeing payment of claims or wages due
laborers and materialmen, arising from the performance of or failure
to perform the contract. Such a bond came to be known, therefore,
as one running directly to the public but containing an extrastatutory
provision for the benefit of the third party. 15
The main purpose of such a stipulation is to protect the state
rather than to benefit laborers and materialmen; and from this, it
9 Clark Plastering Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 237 App. Div. 274, 260
N. Y. Supp. 468 (1st Dep't 1932); American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. Wells
Water District, 253 App. Div. 19, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 614 (3d Dep't 1937); see
Note, 77 A. L. R. 142 (1932).
10 Strong v. American Fence Construction Co., 245 N. Y. 48, 156 N. E.
92 (1927).
"1 Graybar Electric Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 157 Misc. 275, 283 N. Y.
Supp. 522 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
12 Maltby and Sons Co. v. Wade, 131 Misc. 143, 227 N. Y. Supp. 90 (Sup.
Ct. 1928) aff'd, 224 App. Div. 779, 230 N. Y. Supp. 839 (4th Dep't 1928).
23 Mcdrath v. Bagley, 273 App. Div. 822, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 298 (2d Dep't
1948) ; Warsawer v. Burghard, 234 App. Div. 346, 254 N. Y. Supp. 749 (1st
Dep't 1932). There, an owner of land hired a real estate agent to find a
purchaser, which he did. The contract of sale contained a clause whereby the
purchaser agreed to indemnify the owner against any claim the agent might
make for commission. It was held that the agent could not maintain an action
as beneficiary against the purchaser for the commissions.
14 Skinner Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Shevlin E. Co., 231 App. Div. 656, 248 N. Y.
Supp. 380 (1st Dep't 1931); Southern Surety Co. v. United States Cast Iron
Pipe and Foundry Co., 13 F. 2d 833 (C. C. A. 8th 1926).
15 See Note, 77 A. L. R. 126 (1932).
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would appear that the latter were incidental beneficiaries and, there-
fore, not in a position to recover on the bond. Yet, majority juris-
dictions permit recovery on the theory that the public is benefited
by the condition and it is conducive to good workmanship and ma-
terials being directed to the job.' 6 Others, including New York, have
taken the view that the condition impairs the security of the public
body for which the work is done, and is, therefore, prejudicial to its
interest.' 7  Others have passed on the competency or power of the
obligee to enter into the extrastatutory provision of the bond, and,
incidentally, the policy of making the provision.'8
To what extent may a laborer or materialman recover on such
a building contractor's surety bond, where his interests conflict with
those of the state or municipality and thus threaten to deplete or ex-
haust the security to the damage of the state or municipality?
The leading case in New York on the question is Fosmire v.
National Surety Company,'9 where the State Highway Commission,
pursuant to the requirements of the Highway Law, exacted of the
contractor a bond conditioned upon faithful performance of the build-
ing contract. There was included in the bond an added provision,
not required by statute, that the state would be protected against
claims for wages of laborers employed on the job. The added pro-
vision was inserted at the direction of the state agency. It was by
virtue of this express reference to laborers in the bond that an unpaid
laborer sought recovery directly from the surety, contending that he
was a direct beneficiary of the contract. The contractor had de-
faulted, with the result that the state was forced to complete the work
at increased cost and heavy loss, for which the bond was security.
Recovery was denied the laborer because "the dominant purpose of
the bond was protection to the State, and that purpose would be de-
feated if laborers would be permitted to sue for wages as often as
there was a default, and, exhausting the penalty of the bond, leave
nothing for the State. The State did not intend to make the em-
ployees of its contractors the beneficiaries of a cause of action to be
enforced in hostility to its own." 20
16 United States Gypsum Co. v. Gleason, 135 Wisc. 539, 116 N. W. 238
(1908); City of Philadelphia v. Stewart, 195 Pa. 309, 45 Ati. 1056 (1900);
Baker v. Bryan, 64 Iowa 561, 21 N. W. 83 (1884).
17 Fosmire v. National Surety Co., 229 N. Y. 44, 127 N. E. 472 (1920);
State v. C. S. Jackson & Co., 137 La. 931, 69 So. 751 (1915) ; Park Bros. &
Co. v. Sykes, 67 Minn. 153, 69 N. W. 712 (1897).
18 American Fidelity Co. v. State, 128 Md. 50. 97 Atl. 12 (1916); Union
Sheet Metal Works v. Dodge, 129 Cal. 390, 62 Pac. 41 (1900) (holding that
the condition is valid and that the materialmen can recover); Smith v. Bow-
man, 32 Utah 33, 88 Pac. 687 (1907) (allowing recovery on the reasoning
that if the bond consisted only of the extra provision not required by the stat-
ute, it could still be reached by third parties) ; Doll v. Crume, 41 Neb. 655,
59 N. W. 806 (1894) (holding that the extra provision can be inserted without
statutory authority).19229 N. Y. 44, 127 N. E. 472 (1920).2 0 Id. at 46, 127 N. E. at 473.
[ VOL.. 23
NOTES AND COMMENT
The New York viewpoint expressed in this case is a minority
view which has never been overruled in New York. The case has
been cited within and without the state 21 as authority for the propo-
sition that a beneficiary entitled to maintain a cause of action on a
contract to which he was not a party, must be a direct beneficiary and
more specifically, that in bond agreements identical to the one in the
Fosnire case, a beneficiary who claims in hostility to the state is not
a direct beneficiary.22
The majority opinions outside of New York have encouraged
recovery in the same situation. Instead of looking to the instrument
for the intent to benefit the complainant, as New York does, the ma-
jority seems to confer the right more from an idea that a moral duty
rests upon the state to protect the laborers and materialmen on the
job, rather than reliance on requirements of privity and considera-
tion.23 In one such jurisdiction where a statutory interpretation re-
quired that the beneficiary give consideration, this theory of moral
duty was held to be insufficient consideration.2 4
Some majority courts have engaged in a presumption that the
parties fixed the amount of the bond sufficiently in anticipation of all
claims of direct beneficiaries; 25 or, by holding that permitting re-
covery has a tendency to impel public officials to fix the amount of
the bond more prudently in the future.26 Others rely on the belief
that liberal recoveries in this field of law have a tendency to improve
the quality of materials and workmanship directed into the perfor-
mance of the contract.27 The fact that the amount of the claim did
not exhaust the penalty of the bond,28 or that the statute of the state
did not provide a lien remedy,29 or that the state bad not as yet
asserted a priority, have also served as bases for recovery. However,
in the latter situation the court avoided passing directly on this
21 Jackman Cigar Mfg. Co. v. John Berger & Son Co., - Ind. -, 52
N. E. 2d 363 (1944).2 2 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 297
N. Y. 31, 74 N. E. 2d 226 (1947); Associated Flour Haulers and Warehouse-
men v. Hoffman, 282 N. Y. 173, 26 N. E. 2d 7 (1940); J. P. Duffy Co. v.
Board of Education, 255 App Div. 493, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 245 (1st Dep't 1938),
aff'd, 280 N. Y. 773, 21 N. E. 2d 527 (1939); E. J. Eddy, Inc. v. Fidelity
and Deposit Co., 265 N. Y. 276, 192 N. E. 410 (1934); Moch Co. v. Rens-
selaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896 (1928); W. J. McCormack
S. Co. v. Edw. D. W. Milligan, Inc., 253 App. Div. 743, 300 N. Y. Supp. 789
(2d Dep't 1937).
23 S. W. Portland Cement Co. v. Williams, 32 N. M. 68, 251 Pac. 380
(1926).
24 McDonald v. American National Bank, 25 Mont. 456, 65 Pac. 896 (1901).
25 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Rainer, 220 Ala. 262, 125 So. 55 (1929) ; see
Note, 77 A. L. R. 205 (1932).
26 S. W. Portland Cement Co. v. Williams, 32 N. M. 68, 251 Pac. 380
(1926).
27 See note 16 supra.
28 Commonwealth v. National Surety Co., 253 Pa. 5, 97 Atl. 1034 (1916).
29 See Note, 77 A. L. R. 141 (1932).
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point.30  Still another court decided that recovery would tend to in-
duce the seeking in the future of two bonds, one for the protection of
the state and the other for the benefit of laborers and materialmen. 31
It has even been suggested that the state "might well be left to look
after its own interests in the matter." 32
A persuasive argument was advanced in one state where the
statute provided a lien remedy. The court reasoned that the filing
of a lien and the resultant imposition of a charge upon the state would
render it decidedly to the interests of the state that laborers and ma-
terialmen have a direct right of recovery upon the bond itself; that
such a right of recovery is of more benefit to the state in the long
run. Recovery was deemed preferable to a situation where the im-
mediate obligation is on the state and all rights have to be worked out
through the state. Furthermore, recovery would avoid circuity of
action. Commenting on the possibility of such claims exhausting the
penalty of the bond, the court said that this was possible but im-
probable; that such an instance would be so rare as not to present a
barrier to recovery, "for if the parties intended to create a direct
obligation to the sub-contractors, then we must assume that they fixed
the amount of the bond accordingly, and it was only by assuming that
they did not intend to create such an obligation that the danger of
loss to the owner from recognizing it would become material." 33
One criticism of the Fosmire case labelled the New York decision
unsound because the pleadings failed to show that the state had any
claim, or that the penalty of the bond was likely to be exhausted.
It was suggested that the third party might have recovered if the
state had been joined as a party to the action and if it could have
been shown that the interests of the state were not imperilled.34
This conclusion receives considerable support from later decisions on
questions left open in the Fosmire case, which in no way disturbs
the basic theory of the case.
When Judge Cardozo spoke in the Fosmire case, he concluded
with this statement: "What the defendant's liability would be if the
action were prosecuted by the people we need not now determine." 35
This question came before the court ten years later in a case involving
a bond identical to the one in the Fosmire case. The Municipal
Board of Education had exacted the bond to guarantee performance
30 See Aetna Casualty & S. Co. v. Earl E. Lansdell Co., 142 Va 450, 130
S. E. 235 (1925); Commonwealth v. National Surety Co., 253 la. 5, 97 Atl.
1034 (1916).
31 S. W. Portland Cement Co. v. Williams, 32 N. M. 68, 251 Pac. 380
(1926).
32 Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors' Surety Bonds, 38
YALE L. J. 2, 23 (1928).
33 Byram Lumber and Supply Co. v. Page, 109 Conn. 256, 146 At. 293,
296 (1929).
34 See note 32 supra.
35 Fosmire v. National Surety Co., 229 N. Y. 44, 49, 127 N. E. 472, 473
(1920).
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of the contract and payment for all materials used, and services ren-
dered, in connection with the work. The Municipal Corporation was
a party to the action and joined in the prayer that the surety be made
to pay in accordance with its promise. There was no hostility to any
interest of the state. The court held that the amount claimed could
be recovered from the surety and paid to the municipality to be held
in trust for the claimant third party, and, in fact, for the avoidance
of circuity of action might be paid to the third party directly.30
However, the trust provision in that case was not intended to
decide that a third party with insufficient interest to maintain an ac-
tion on the contract might thereupon treat the promisee as trustee of
a cause of action in his favor and, in effect, require him to sue in
equity. This was pointed out by the court in a later case where the
City of New York declined to sue on the bond and join in the action
for the benefit of the third party. The city, was satisfied since the
work was done, and, therefore, had no further interest in the matter.
The court denied recovery deciding that no one could force the city
to join in the action for the benefit of the third party; but, the court
added that recovery would have been granted if the city had elected
to join in the suit.37
In further variations of the Fosmire decision, recovery was al-
lowed where the claim of the municipality had already been settled
in full,38 but was disallowed where the municipality had not, as yet,
received substantial performance. 39 Recovery was granted in a case
where two bonds had been secured. Since the state wa's protected
in a separate bond, recovery was allowed the materialmen because
"No competition arises between the State and another- beneficiary, as
was in the case of Fosmire v. National Surety Company." 40
36 Johnson Service Co. v. Monin, Inc., 253 N. Y. 417, 422, 171 N. E. 692,
693 (1930). "In thus holding the surety to the performance of its covenant,
we do not leave it helpless, without means of reimbursement. What it pays
to the Municipality will be subject to a trust for the benefit of the Buckeye
Blower Co., [one of the subcontractors whose lien was disallowed as defective,
but whose right of action was recognized against the surety] and indeed .for
the avoidance of circuity may be paid to that company directly. In return it
will have the right to be subrogated in an equivalent amount to the right of its
own principal, the general contractor, to collect from the Municipality the bal-
ance due under the contract. In the end, the materialman will have reimburse-
ment from the surety and the surety from the City. The loss will fall on the
contractor who in equity should bear it."
3 William S. Van Clief & Sons v. City of New York, 141 Misc. 216, 252
N. Y. Supp. 402 (Sup. Ct. 1931).38 See note 12 smipra.
3 E. J. Eddy, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 265 N. Y. 276, 192 N. E.
410 (1934).
40 McClare v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 266 N. Y. 371, 377, 195 N. E. 15,
16 (1935). There was shown a clear intent on the part of defendant to benefit
two classes of creditors, namely, those who were creditors because of debts
arising out of cash forfeits, and those who were creditors because they had
furnished work, labor and services in connection with the staging of boxing
bouts. Since the State was the sole beneficiary of one bond, and no other
1949 ]
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Where a bond was given for the benefit of any materialman or
laborer having a joint claim, as well as for the obligee herein, re-
covery was allowed, but the court was careful to point out that re-
covery was not inconsistent with the Fosmire decision because all
claims of the obligee were settled and the penal sum of the bond was
greater than all claims of third parties.41 In recent years, the de-
cisions in New York have followed the Fosmire viewpoint.42
Judge Cardozo, in Strong v. American Fence Co.,43 distinguished
the Fosmire case by pointing out that the bond involved was required
by a federal statute, and that both the purpose of the statute and the
expression in the bond, specifically, gave laborers a right of action on
the bond. The right of action was the dominant purpose of the
bond, as contrasted with the purpose of the bond in the Fosmire case,
which by statute was intended only to guaranty performance of the
contract, but to which was added the extra-statutory provision for
payment of claims of laborers and materialmen. In the Fosmire case,
Judge Cardozo had stated: "A different question would be here if
the bond had been conditioned for the payment of wages and nothing
else. The interest of the State in the welfare of those who labor on
its public works might then point to an intention to create a cause of
action in their favor." 44 Judge Cardozo, referring to the above ex-
pression, stated, "Fosmire v. National Surety Company holds nothing
to the contrary. There are many grounds of distinction. Enough
for present purposes that there the bond was not exacted in fulfill-
ment of a duty." 45 A similar right of recovery was granted on a
bond expressly giving the third party a direct right of action on the
bond despite the fact that the claimants were previously held not en-
titled to share in funds remaining in the hands of municipal officials.46
The problem raised in the Fosmire case has been controlled in
the federal jurisdiction by resort to legislation requiring that persons
contracting with the United States for public construction work must
provide the penal bond with sufficient sureties, the bond to contain
the additional obligations that such contractor or contractors shall
promptly make payments to all persons supplying him or them labor
and materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in such
contract. Under a ruling of the Supreme Court, a bond so given
inures to the protection of laborers and materialmen employed by the
purpose for the second bond was shown, the plaintiff creditors were considered
direct beneficiaries, otherwise, the giving of the bond would be an idle act or
gesture.
41 See note 11 supra.
42 See note 22 supra.
43 245 N. Y. 48, 156 N. E. 92 (1927).
44 Fosmire v. National Surety Co., 229 N. Y. 44, 48, 127 N. E. 472, 473
(1920).
45 Strong v. American Fence Co., 245 N. Y. 48, 53, 156 N. E. 92, 94 (1927).
46 American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. Wells Water D., 253 App. Div. 19,
1 N. Y. S. 2d 614 (3d Dep't 1937).
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subcontractors, and the contractor remains liable to the extent of the
penaity though the subcontractors have been paid before notice of
the claim. 4
7
The federal statute in its earliest form did not give any prefer-
ence to the United States against the surety,48 but by later amend-
ment expressly conferred a preference on the United States requir-
ing that all laborers and materialmen must join in a single suit against
the surety brought not later than twelve months after final settlement
with the United States. If the penalty of the bond is not sufficient
to pay all such claimants, they share pro-rata.49
In New York, there is no similar statute, but in this particular,
the Fosmire decision has effectively, though perhaps not deliberately
given the state the preference which the federal statute gives to the
United States. After the state has settled its claim against the
surety, the laborer or materialman makes out a prima facie case by
proving his own demand. He must prove his damages or fail, and
in no event is he entitled to more than his pro-rata share unless, of
course, the amount of bond is adequate. The surety need not fear
that his final liability will be greater in the aggregate than the pen-
alty of the bond, for after the laborer or materialman -has made out
his prima facie case, the proof of such claim is sufficient to cast the
burden on the surety to show in reduction of the damages that there
are other unpaid claimants entitled to share in the security. The
aggregate liability to all must be within the penalty. '0
Conclusion
It is difficult to be unimpressed by the arguments of the ma-
jority jurisdictions that liberality in allowing recovery, in a situation
like the Fosinire case, tends to benefit the state by affording a more
secure basis to laborers and materialmen for entering upon public
works. Nor is it easy to overlook the benefit that the state must
derive from permitting recovery, wherever subcontractors and ma-
terialmen have a right to proceed directly against the property bene-
fited or the public funds provided by way of a lien.
Furthermore, it is a matter of sound business to advocate a lib-
eral extension of the right of materialmen to recover from the com-
pensated surety. Although the materialman receives his security for
nothing, and receives this right by donation, so to speak, yet in the
gradual adjustment of prices and wages, his compensation tends to
become smaller as the risk of non-payment is thrown upon a com-
47 Mankin v. United States, 215 U. S. 533, 54 L. ed. 315 (1910).
48 Davidson Bros. Marble Co. v. United States ex rel. Gibson, 213 U. S.
10, 53 L. ed. 675 (1909).
49 United States v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 18 F. 2d 203 (C. C. A. 6th
1927).50 Strong v. American Fence Co., 245 N. Y. 48, 156 N. E. 92 (1927).
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mercial surety. Little solicitude is shown for the compensated surety,
especially when he has had a chance to investigate his risk before
signing the bond and has been paid to take the risk. A New York
court has stated that the trend of opinion is to permit a right of re-
covery against the compensated surety who has issued the standard
form of bond, by way of a liberal interpretation and a resolving of
ambiguities in favor of the one for whose benefit the bond is given. 51
Of course, the majority idea of the moral duty of the state fur-
nishing the basis of recovery seems to be expressed in every state
where a lien statute provides a means to laborers or materialmen of
encumbrancing private property or public funds (standing in the
place thereof) when they have benefited or improved such property
by their work or materials. In New York the mechanics lien does
not attach to public buildings or real property, but does attach to
the public funds provided for the improvements furnished by the
claimants.
There is no lien statute applying to the federal jurisdiction.
Instead, a federal statute requires that the contractor provide a bond
expressly giving the laborer or materialman the right to act on the
bond against the surety. The bond is regarded as a substitute for the
mechanics lien, for "As against the United States, no lien can be
provided upon its public buildings or grounds ..... " The Supreme
Court has referred to such a bond as being in the nature of a special
lien in the sense that the bond is substituted in the place of the public
buildings as the thing on which the lien is charged. 2 Therefore, un-
less some added right is given, the third party has less security when
directing his efforts or materials into real property of the state, than
when he improves private realty.
The fact that the lien remedy is unavailable or limited where
public property is involved, has caused majority jurisdictions to allow
recovery to laborers and materialmen against the surety by direct
action on the bond on the basis of a moral duty resting upon the
public to at least equalize the remedies provided where improvements
are made to private property. With this in mind, federal jurisdic-
tions have provided a statute requiring that the contractor's bond ex-
pressly give the laborer or materialman a direct cause of action against
the surety on the bond, somewhat in the nature of a special lien. New
York makes available a limited lien statute where the public is the
obligee and a history of decisional law curtently proclaiming the need
and desirability for permitting a liberal right of recovery to the third
party laborer or materialman on the surety bond but conditioning
such right on the absence of hostility to conflicting interest of the
state.
51 See McClare v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 266 N. Y. 371, 377, 195 N. E.
15, 17 (1935).
52 United States v. American Surety Co., 200 U. S. 197, 203, 50 L. ed.
438, 440 (1906).
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NOTES AND COMMENT
Which of the above three methods, therefore, of dealing with
the same problem, would be best suited to cope with the post war
construction program, which is bound to bring about an unprece-
dented resort to the use of contractors' bond agreements?
One may well inquire whether New York should find an advan-
tage in emulating the federal approach to the matter, since, as we
have seen, the right of the third party beneficiary may stand or fall
dependent on the attitude of the state in the matter. It is apparent
that an immediate benefit from a statute such as the federal statute
is that at all times, the parties know where they stand.
BENJAMIN F. NOLAN.
APPRAISAL OF STOCK WHERE CERTAIN STOCKHOLDERS HAVE
DISSENTED-BASIS FOR DETERMINING VALUE
While the management of a corporation is vested in its board
of directors,' there are some functions over which the directors do
not have exclusive power, and in the exercise of which the consent
of a number of stockholders must be obtained. These acts, which
require the stockholders' assent, are usually acts other than everyday
business affairs, and are often termed "extraordinary acts." 2 They
include: issuance of stock to employees, 3 voluntary sale of a corpora-
tion's property, rights, privileges and franchises, 4 making changes re-
specting shares or capital,5 merging,6 and consolidating.7
Where a corporation wishes to effect these results, a problem
arises as to those stockholders who object. In order to protect the
rights of these dissenting minority shareholders and at the same time
allow the bulk of the shareholders to take beneficial action without
being hindered by a minority,8 the Stock Corporation Law gives them
'N. Y. GEr4. CORP. LAW § 27; Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 323, 119
N. E. 559, 562 (1918) (as a general rule, the stockholders cannot act in rela-
tion to the ordinary business of the corporation, nor can they control the di-
rectors in the exercise of the judgment vested in them by virtue of their office) ;
Pollitz v. Wabash R. R., 207 N. Y. 113, 100 N. E. 721 (1912); Beveridge v.
N. Y. E. R. R., 112 N. Y. 1, 19 N. E. 489 (1889) ; Leslie v. Lorillard, 110
N. Y. 519, 18 N. E. 363 (1888).
2 Metropolitan Elevated R. R. v. Manhattan Elevated R. R., 11 Daly 373,
475 (N. Y. 1884).
3 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 14.
4N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 20.
5 N. Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW § 36.
6 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 85.
7N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 86, 91.
8 "The purpose of section 21 of the Stock Corporation Law was to protect
dissenting shareholders, and the process of appraisal was designed to meet two
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